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Summary  findings
Denizer, Dinc, and Tarimcilar examine banking  banks. Banks that were privately owned or foreign
efficiency before and after liberalization, drawing on  owned had been expected to respond better to
Turkey's experience. They also investigate the scale  liberalization, because they were smaller and more
effect on efficiency by type of ownership.  dynamically structured, but they were no more efficient
Their findings suggest that liberalization programs  than state-owned banks.
were followed by an observable decline in efficiency, not  One reason for the systemwide decline in efficiency
an improvement. During the study period Turkish banks  might have been the general increase in macroeconomic
did not operate at the optimum scale.  instability during the period studied.
Another unexpected result was that efficiency was no
different between state-owned and privately owned
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Over the last two decades the globalization of financial markets has gained
additional momentum as a result of liberalization programs undertaken by various
countries. This, in turn, enhanced the economic links between these markets and hence
deepened the integration of financial institutions (Ragunathan, 1999). As a result, these
financial institutions face today a fast-paced, dynamic, and competitive environment at a
global scale. Within such a competitive environment, financial institutions are forced to
examine their performance because their survival in the dynamic economies of 2l't
century will be dependent upon their productive efficiencies. Some earlier studies (Berger
and Humphrey, 1991; Berger, Hancock and Humphrey, 1993; and Berger, Hunter and
Timme, 1993) showed that, particularly in banking sector, inefficiencies are more
important than scale and scope issues. Hence, in response, firms have been trying to
adapt and to adjust themselves to improve their productive efficiencies in this changing
social and economic environment (Harker and Zenios, 2000).
For the past 20 years these circumstances prompted many countries to liberalize
their financial sector through deregulation in order to improve efficiency performance.
Bhattacharyya, Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar (1997) report that deregulation and
liberalization had a major impact on productivity and efficiency increases in various
industries and the banking sector in some Eastern and Central European countries, as well
as China. Although the primary goal of liberalization and deregulation has been to
improve efficiency, earlier results have been mixed, -in particular, the short-term effects
of liberalization have been discouraging (Leightner and Lovell, 1998; Harker and Zenios,
22000). For example, Berg, Forsund and Johnson (1991) found that in Norway during
1980-89 the productivity of banks declined initially but eventually rose. Zaim (1995)
reported efficiency gains in Turkish banks after the 1980 liberalization program.
Leightner and Lovell (1998) investigated the Thai banking industry from both the bank
and the government's perspective from 1989 to 1994. They found that the average Thai
bank had a rapid productivity gain based on its own objectives, but that during this period
productivity gains from the liberalization program could not help advancing the
government objectives (overall economic growth). Korea launched a major financial
liberalization program in the 1980s. Gilbert and Wilson (1998) examined Korean banking
institutions between 1980 and 1994 and found that most Korean banks experienced
efficiency gains during this period as government controls were lifted. On the other hand,
it was found that in the U.S. (Humprey and Pulley, 1997) and in Spain' (Grifell-Tatje and
Lovell, 1996) deregulation resulted in a decline in efficiency.
It will be prudent to keep in mind that the consequences of deregulation may
differ across countries and may also depend on the sectoral conditions prior to
deregulation. Furthermore, it should be noted that all of the aforementioned studies
investigated the efficiency after or during the deregulation period without covering the
period before liberalization/deregulation programs. This may have altered the real impact
of such programs. Extending the evaluation to before and after liberalization could show
the real impact of liberalization programs on efficiency, but this has not yet been
demonstrated (Harker and Zenios, 2000). There have been a number of studies on
liberalization programs and their impact on efficiency in industrialized countries and
' Later,  Grifell-Tatje  and Lovell,  (1997)  employed  a different  specification  and  reached  to the opposite
conclusion.
3transition economies. However, a limited number of studies have been undertaken in the
context of mixed developing economies where deregulation and liberalization programs
have been introduced (Bhattacharyya et al, 1997).
Turkey has undergone a number of major policy changes in bank regulation over
the last 20 years (Zaim, 1995; Zaim and Taskin, 1997; Denizer, 1997). The country's
banking sector has been a target of heavy regulatory interventions 2 for a long time.
However, since the 1980s there has been a persistent move to liberalize banking markets
in order to increase competition and hence to improve the efficiency of the financial
systems. The liberalization program either abolished or relaxed regulations, and the
sector responded quickly to these developments. Increased competitPon  forced the banks
to reduce their costs, which resulted in the closure of unprofitable branches and the
reduction of staff. This eventually increased the profitability of the banking system
(Mahmud and Zaim 1997). Even after such improvements, the question of whether
financial reforms improved efficiency remains to be answered. Some earlier studies
(Zaim, 1995; Ertugrul and Zaim, 1996) examined the impact of financial liberalization on
the efficiency of Turkish banking and found that liberalization had a positive effect on
efficiency. These studies, however, were focused on certain functions of banking and
were limited to few years after the liberalization program. Hence, a comparison of before
2 Gual  (1999)  groups  these  regulatory  interventions  into  three  major  categories.  The  first  one is  regulations
that  soften  domestic  competition.  This  category  includes  controls  on  credit,  interest  rates  and  fees,
restrictions  on entry  and  mergers  and  acquisitions,  and  controls  on  capital  flows.  The  second  group  is
regulations  that  limit  the  scope  and  scale  of  banks.  This  category  involves  restrictions  on  domestic
branching  and  establishment  in foreign  markets,  and  limits  to activities  within  conventional  banking,
insurance,  and  securities.  The  last  group  is mainly  concerned  with  regulations  that  alter  the  external
competitive  position  of banks.  This  final  category  deals  with  reserve  and  investment  coefficients,  solvency
and  capital  adequacy  regulations,  deposit  insurance  schemes,  and  restrictions  on  ownership  linkages  with
non-financial  firms.
4and after liberalization was not possible. Mercan and Yolalan (2000) provide an excellent
survey of other studies of the efficiency of Turkish banks.
In this paper, we use a non-parametric mathematical programming model, DEA,
for each year from 1970 to 1994 to determine whether or not the liberalization program
improved the efficiency of the Turkish banks by function and by ownership. It is
hypothesized that after liberalization with the increasing new entries and relaxed
regulation competition will intensify, which in turn will discipline banks in resource
management and force them to be more efficient. We also examine the sources of
inefficiency by function and by ownership.
This study significantly differs from earlier works in two respects. First, the
application of a two-stage DEA methodology to the banking sector facilitates
investigation of both production and intermediation functions of the banks to determine
the relationship of these two components of bank operations. It allows us to examine the
banks' efficiency in separate dimensions without one biasing the other. Although these
components are two discrete analyses, they complete a continuum in presenting a more
comprehensive picture of the system. Secondly, the temporal focus of the study is 1970 to
1994. Using an unprecedented twenty-five year time series of data improves the chances
of identifying the long-term policy implications and comparing efficiency before and
after liberalization.
The organization of the paper is as follows: The next section gives a short history
of recent policy and regulation changes in the Turkish banking sector. Section 3 discusses
methodology and its strengths. A two-stage modeling framework is presented, which
considers both roles in this section. The selected variables and reasoning behind the
5selection with the modeling framework are also discussed. Section 4 presents the findings
and discussion. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research.
TURKISH BANKING SECTOR REFORMS
Until the 1  980s, economic policies in Turkey were inward looking, with extensive
protection against foreign competition. During this period the share of state in banking,
for example, reached to more than 50 percent (Zaim and Taskin, 1997; Denizer, 1997).
Because of entry restrictions prior to 1980, Turkish commercial banks enjoyed an
oligopolistic environment and faced almost no competition. As a result these banks were
highly profitable. Such profitability may have given overconfidence to commercial
banks, which in turn might have prevented a careful analysis of bank performance and
managerial ability of their executives. This lack of awareness would have caught these
institutions off-guard after the liberalization program (Oral and Yolalan, 1990).
As a part of a structural adjustment program to switch to an outward-oriented
growth strategy, the Turkish economy in general and financial system in particular have
been significantly opened up and liberalized over the last two decades. The banking-
related component of these reforms had two key elements: the elimination of controls on
interest rates and a significant reduction in directed credit programs, as well as the
relaxation of entry barriers into the banking system in order to promote competition and
increase efficiency. There were also measures to develop equity and bond markets. In
1984 Turkish residents were allowed to open foreign currency accounts in banks, thereby
increasing product variety and services. This process culminated in the opening up of the
6capital account in 1989, further facilitating international trade in goods and financial
services.
These were important changes considering the earlier constraints on financial
markets. Interest rates had been controlled since the 1940s -a policy in keeping with the
state-led development strategy based on import substitution. Rates had been changed only
five or six times until 1978. The interest rate control policies led banks already in the
system to non-price competition through the opening of new branches. Directed credit
programs absorbed almost 75 percent of loanable funds. Entry, especially after the early
1960s, was highly restrictive. This situation, coupled with the exit of a large number of
banks during the 1960-80 period, resulted in a concentrated market dominated by large
private and public banks with extensive branch networks. Among the 42 existing banks in
1980, only four were foreign. Accordingly, the bank-dominated financial sector was
uncompetitive and inefficient prior to 1980 with a limited range of products (Denizer,
1997). Moreover, the government strictly controlled the capital account.
There were marked changes in the financial sector following the liberalization of
financial prices and policies in the 1980s. The Istanbul Stock Exchange was reopened
and, over time, became an integral part of the financial system.  Government securities
began to be auctioned in 1985 and quickly became an important portion of the stock of
financial assets. The inter-bank market began to operate in 1986, allowing banks to lend
and borrow from each other for overnight facilities. While these liberalization activities
were taking place, Turkey did not privatize the large public banks. These banks still play
a significant role in the banking sector, accounting for about 40 percent of total banking
assets.
7What has been remarkable about financial liberalization in Turkey has been the
entry of new banks, both domestic and foreign. By 1990 there were 23 foreign banks in
the system, meaning 19 new entries, which matches the number of new entries by the
Turkish banks. With interest rate deregulation, which allowed banks to engage in price
competition, the entry of new banks led to a significant decline in the traditional
measures of concentration ratios, suggesting that competition in the sector has improved.
These visible changes indicate that there have been major movements towards the
free operation of financial markets. Indeed, by 1998 the Turkish banking sector had
minimal policy constraints on domestic and financial market intermediation (Denizer,
Gultekin, and Gultekin, 2000). Although this is the outcome targeted by the reforms,
whether the reforms achieved their key objective, namnely,  increasing the efficiency of the
financial sector, is more difficult to assess. A casual look at the present banking sector
suggests efficiency improvements have been less than expected, as operating ratios
remained relatively high. As noted earlier, the few existing studies do not fully take into
account the various dimensions of efficiency measures. This study aims to fill that gap in
the literature.
METHODOLOGY
The two approaches used to assess productive efficiency of an entity, parametric
(or econometric) and non-parametric (mathematical programming), employ different
techniques to envelop a data set with different assumptions for random noise and for the
structure of the production technology. These assumptions, in fact, generate the strengths
8and weaknesses of both approaches. The essential differences and the sources of
(dis)advantages of these approaches can be grouped under two categories: (a). The
econometric approach is stochastic and attempts to distinguish the effects of noise from
the effects of inefficiency; it is based on sampling theory for the interpretation of
essentially statistical results. The programming approach is non-stochastic, and hence
groups noise and inefficiency together and calls this combination "inefficiency." It is
built on the findings and observation of population and assesses efficiency relative to
other observed units. (b). The econometric approach is parametric and confounds the
effects of misspecification of functional form with inefficiency. The programming model
is non-parametric and population-based and hence less prone to this type of specification
error (Lovell 1993).
This inquiry employs the non-parametric frontier approach 3 to estimate the
relative efficiency of commercial banks in Turkey. This approach, also known as Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), is a mathematical programming technique that measures
the efficiency of a decision-making unit (DMU) relative to other similar DMUs with the
simple restriction that all DMUs lie on or below the efficiency frontier (Seiford and
Thrall, 1990). It was first introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978. Since then
its utilization and development have grown rapidly including many banking-related
applications. For a detailed review of these extensions and developments in DEA, see
Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford, (1994) and Seiford, (1994, 1996).
This analysis is concerned with understanding how each DMU is performing
relative to others, the causes of inefficiency, and how a DMU can improve its
3 Bauer,  Berger,  Ferrier  and Humphrey  (1998)  provide  a detailed  comparison  of methods  used in measuring
the efficiency  of financial  institutions.
9performance to become efficient. In that sense, the focus of the methodology should be
on each individual DMU rather than on the averages of the whole body of DMUs. DEA
calculates the relative efficiency of each DMU in relation to all the other DMUs by using
the actual observed values for the inputs and outputs of each DMU. It also identifies, for
inefficient DMUs, the sources and level of inefficiency for each of the inputs and outputs
(Chames, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford, 1994).
Basic DEA Models
DEA begins with a relatively simple fractional programming formulation.
Assume that there are n DMUs to be evaluated. Each consumes different amounts of i
inputs and produces r different outputs, i.e. DMUj consumes xJi  amounts of input to
produce yjr amounts of output. It is assumed that these inputs, xji,  and outputs, yjr,  are
non-negative, and each DMU has at least one positive input and output value. The
productivity of a DMU can be written as:
s
E  U  Yrj
h  =  =  (1)
Evi  xi
i=l
In this formulation, u and v are the weights assigned to each input and output. By
using mathematical programming techniques, DEA optimally assigns the weights subject
to the following constraints:
The weights for each DMU are assigned subject to the constraint that no other
DMU has an efficiency greater than 1 if it uses the same weights, implying that efficient
DMUs will have a ratio value of 1.
The derived weights, u and v are not negative.
10The objective function of DMUk is the ratio of the total weighted output divided by the
total weighted input:
Maximize  hk=  r=l  (2)
s
E UrYrj
subjectto  r=  ￿  <1  forj=1  ... n  (3)
i=1
v 2>0 fori  = I.... m, and  ur  20  forr  l.....s
This is a simple presentation of basic DEA model.
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) employed the optimization method of
mathematical programming to generalize the Farrel (1957) single-output/input technical-
efficiency measure to multiple-output/multiple-input case. The characteristics of the
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) ratio model is the reduction of the multiple-output
/multiple-input situation for each DMU to a single virtual output and a single virtual input
ratio. This ratio provides a measure of efficiency for a given DMU, which is a function of
multipliers. The objective is to find the largest sum of weighted outputs of DMUk, while
keeping the sum of its weighted inputs at the unit value, thereby forcing the ratio of the
weighted output to the weighted input for any DMU to be less than one. The CCR model
is also known as the constant return to scale model, and it identifies inefficient units
regardless of their scale size. In the CCR models, both technical and scale inefficiency is
present.
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) take into account the effect of returns to scale
within the group of DMUs to be analyzed. The purpose here is to point out the most
11efficient scale size for each DMU and at the same time to identify its technical efficiency.
To do so, the Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) model introduces another restriction,
convexity, to the envelopment requirements. This model requires that the reference point
on the production function for DMUk will be a convex combination of the observed
efficient DMUs. The BCC model, known as variable returns to scale model, gives the
technical efficiency of DMUs under investigation without any scale effect.
It is possible to create and estimate models that provide input-oriented or output-
oriented projections for both CCR (constant returns to scale) and BCC (variable returns
to scale) envelopment. An input-oriented model attempts to maximize the proportional
decrease in input variables while remaining within the envelopment space. On the other
hand, an output-oriented model maximizes the proportional increase in the output
variables, while remaining within the envelopment space.
The Warwick Windows DEA version 1.02 is used in this study to solve the
models. CCR and BCC input oriented models have been executed for every year from
1970 to 1994 for commercial banks in Turkey. These models identify efficiency in two
stages; the intermediate point is first obtained, and then the subsequent projection point is
found by solving the second stage. Formulations of these models are presented in
Appendix B.
Variable Selection 4
It is commonly acknowledged that the choice of variables in efficiency studies
significantly affects the results. A number of studies present results that differ due to
variable selection (Favero and Pappi, 1995; Hunter and Timme, 1995). There are,
12however, certain limitations on variable selection due to the reliability of the data. For
example, the variables may present different information, although they carry the same
label, or the same information may be reported under different labels. This variation
stems from the lack of reporting standards in banking industry. On the other hand, the use
of unnecessary variables clutters the analysis and makes it difficult to interpret for both
parametric and non-parametric studies. The burden is on the study to tediously justify the
selection process. The variable selection for this study relied mainly on classical banking
theory.
Another important complication in bank efficiency studies that affects the variable
selection and hence the results is the definition of a bank's function. Therefore, before
discussing the application and variable selection it is useful to understand the banking
process, thereby furnishing guidelines for variable selection and application processes.
The role of a commercial bank is generally defined as collecting the savings of
households and other agents to finance the investment needs of firms and consumption
needs of individuals. Three approaches in the banking literature discuss the activities of
banks: the production approach, the intermediation approach and the modem approach
(Freixas and Rochet, 1997). The first two approaches apply the traditional
microeconomic theory of the firm to banking and differ only in the specification of
banking activities. The third approach goes one step further and incorporates some
specific activities of banking into the classical theory and hence modifies it.
In the production approach, banking activities are described as the production of
services to depositors and borrowers. Traditional production factors, land, labor and
capital, are used as inputs to produce desired outputs. Although this approach recognizes
4 Golany and  Roll (1989)  provide  an in-depth  discussion  of variable  selection  process  in DEA  applications.
13the multi-product nature of banking activities, earlier studies ignored this aspect of
banking products, partly because the techniques to deal with scale and scope issues were
not well developed (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). This approach suffers from a basic
problem in terms of measurement of outputs. Is it the number of accounts, the number of
operations on these accounts, or the dollar amounts? The generally accepted approach is
to use dollar amounts because of availability of such data.
The intermediation approach is in fact complementary to the production approach
and describes the banking activities as transforming the money borrowed from depositors
into the money lent to borrowers. This transformation activity originates from the
different characteristics of deposits and loans. Deposits are typically divisible, liquid and
riskless, while on the other hand loans are indivisible illiquid and risky. In this approach,
inputs are financial capital -the deposits collected and funds borrowed from financial
markets, and outputs are measured by the volume of loans and investments outstanding.
The modem approach has the novelty of integrating risk management and
information processing into the classical theory of the firm. One of the most innovative
parts of this approach is the introduction of the quality of banks' assets and the
probability of banks' failure in the estimation of costs. It can be argued that this approach
is embedded in the previous approaches (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). This third approach,
perhaps, can be best represented through the ratio-based CAMEL approach. In this
approach, Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity are
derived from the financial tables of the bank and are used as variables in the performance
analysis (Mercan and Yolalan, 2000).
14Banks were analyzed as production units in some earlier studies (Ferrier and
Lovell, 1990; Shaffnit, Rosen and Paradi, 1997; Zenios, Zenios, Agathocleous, Soteriou,
1999; Athanassopoulos and Giokas, 2000), while others considered them as intermediary
institutions (Barr, Seiford, and Siems, 1994; Athanassopoulos and Giokas, 2000). The
importance of the definition of banking function is clear in determining the input and
output variables for an efficiency study. Although it is obvious that the banks carry both
functionalities, for a quantitative study the choice has to be made due to a conflict in
variable definitions.
In light of these considerations, this study utilizes the production and
intermediation approaches complementarily in the analysis of the efficiency of Turkish
commercial banks. It is assumed that banking is a simultaneously occurring two-stage
process. During the production stage banks collect deposits by using their resources,
labor and physical capital. Banks use their managerial and marketing skills in the
intermediation stage to transform these deposits into loans and investments. This
framework is employed to determine the application process as well as the selection of
inputs and outputs for the analysis of efficiency.
Figure 1 Banking Process
Following the above-discussed framework, three variables were selected as inputs
for production stage of the banking: total own resources of the bank, total personnel
expenses, and the interests and fees paid by the bank. At this stage a bank produces two
outputs: total deposits and income from charges and commissions collected. The outputs
of the previous stage may be seen as inputs for the intermediation process, and hence
total deposits will be input. In addition operating expenditures, excluding personnel
15expenses, will be the other input in this stage. Since personnel expenses are used as an
input in the previous stage in order to avoid double counting, this variable is not included
into the operating expenses in the intermediation stage as an input. The outputs of this
stage are total loans and banking related income (interest and commission collected, and
charges and commission for banking). All input and output variables are normalized by
dividing them by the number of branches.
All data used in this study come from the Banks Associations of Turkey.
Application
Within this framework, this study utilizes a two-stage DEA analysis. In the first
stage, the relative efficiency of the production process of banking is assessed. In the
second stage the efficiency of intermediation process of banking is examined. The
underlying reason for this is that a bank may perform relatively better in collecting
deposits by using less resources than its competitors, compensating its losses in the
intermediation process or vice versa. The performance matrix shows that a bank may be
in four different positions regarding its performance in the production and intermediation
processes. It is obvious from the performance matrix that the most desirable position is
the first row where a bank performs well in both the production and intermediation
processes. However, these institutions are for-profit entities, -depending on the gains
from the each process, a bank may intentionally choose either the second or the fourth
row to accomplish some short-term objectives i.e. market share growth or introduction of
a new financial product.
Figure 2 Performance Matrix
16Scale Issue
Although commercial banks are homogeneous with respect to their organizational
structure, goals and objectives, they vary significantly in size and production level. Even
after normalizing the data, this suggests that the scale of banks plays an important role in
their relative efficiency or inefficiency. As previously stated, the CCR model
comprehends both technical and scale efficiency. The BCC model, introduced by Banker,
Charnes and Cooper (1984), separates technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Indeed,
they showed that the CCR efficiency measure can be regarded as the product of a
technical efficiency measure, given by the BCC efficiency score and a scale efficiency
measure (Banker and Thrall, 1992). BCC also modified the original CCR linear
programming formulation by adding a convexity constraint for the production possibility
set to estimate not only technical efficiency, but also returns to scale (Banker et al., 1984;
Banker and Thrall, 1992).
Banker (1984) showed that the CCR measure captures not only the productive
inefficiency of a DMU at its actual scale size, but also any inefficiency resulting from its
actual scale size being different from the most productive scale size. A most productive
scale size maximizes average productivity. In order to maximize average productivity, a
DMU would have to increase its scale size if increasing returns to scale were prevailing,
and decrease the scale size if decreasing returns to scale were prevailing (Banker, 1984).
It follows that a technically efficient and scale efficient DMU will be in the most
productive scale size.
17Given that the CCR efficiency score is a product of technical and scale efficiency,
and BCC measures pure technical efficiency, then the ratio of the efficiency scores
S  qk,CCR  yields a measure of the relative scale efficiency of bank k. If S = 1 it is said
qk,BCC
that bank k is operating at the most efficient scale size. If it is less than unity, this means
there is scale inefficiency for bank k. Thus, (1-S) represents the relative scale inefficiency
of a bank (Banker et al., 1984; Banker and Thrall, 1992; Banker et al., 1996). The units
that are CCR efficient will also be scale efficient, since scale was already factored in the
CCR model. Thus, the two are equal. The units that are BCC efficient, but inefficient
based on the CCR model, have a scale inefficiency. Since they were technically efficient,
all of the inefficiencies picked up by CCR are due to scale. Those units that are CCR
efficient are considered most productive scale sizes, as the average productivity of each
of those units is maximized.
This can serve as a useful diagnostic tool for decision makers and bank directors.
Once technical and scale efficiency are isolated, the next step is to determine the share of
the overall inefficiency that is attributable to technical inefficiency and scale inefficiency.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
This study examines the impact of financial liberalization of 1980 on Turkish
banks in terms of efficiency gains (losses) as well as sources of inefficiencies. The
analysis produced four sets of efficiency scores for each year from 1970 to 1994. They
are the total efficiency scores, which are generated by the CCR model and the technical
efficiency scores, which are generated by the BCC models for both stages of banking
18process, namely production and intermediation. These scores are presented as annual
averages of banks under investigation for the whole Turkish banking system. Although
averaging the scores causes loss of information, particularly the variation among
individual banks, analyzing and reporting them all on an individual bank basis would
require a separate study. The number of banks under investigation ranged from 29 in
1976 and 1977 to 53 in 1991 (see Appendix A Table 1). Recall that the main hypothesis
of the study was that the liberalization policies would have a positive impact on banking
sector efficiencies. If the liberalization had a positive impact on the overall efficiency of
Turkish Banking system, it is expected that the annual average efficiency scores would
increase over time.
Average Efficiency of Turkish Commercial Banking
The results of the CCR model for both production and intermediation processes of
the banking system are presented in Figure 3 (see also Appendix A Table 3). From 1970
to 1994, the average relative efficiency of Turkish banking in terms of production process
fluctuated wildly, from a high 80 percent to a low 47 percent. Prior to 1980, the
production performance of the banking systems appeared to be relatively more stable
than after liberalization, with an average efficiency ranging from 71 percent to 80
percent. After liberalization, banking efficiency increased until 1984, although it never
reached its earlier performance level. The relative efficiency of Turkish banking began to
fluctuate after 1985. The results for the production process of banking as shown in Figure
3 suggest that the annual average efficiency of the banking system as a whole followed a
19downward trend, which also suggests that the liberalization program did not fulfill its
promise in terms of efficiency gains in the production process of banking.
Figure 3: Average Efficiency of Turkish Banking (CCR)
Figure 3 also shows the results of CCR model for intermediation process. The
Turkish banking system had relatively lower efficiency scores in intermediation than
production, and similar to the production process, fluctuated wildly from a high of 82
percent to a low of 35 percent. This suggests that the banking system performed
relatively poorly in its basic function: transforming deposits to loans. The slope of the
trend line for intermediation, which is steeper than production, is another indicator of this
fact. The performance of the Turkish banking system declined between 1978 1990,
although there was a short recovery period from 1981 to 1985.
Despite the homogeneity of their organizational structure, goals, and objectives,
banks vary significantly in size and production level. Even with normalizing, as in this
study, the data may not address the scale effect on their relative efficiency or inefficiency.
We know that the CCR model comprises both technical and scale efficiency together.
Hence, the above results include inefficiencies resulting from sub-optimal scale size of
Turkish banks. In order to determine the level of scale inefficiency and in order to
identify pure technical efficiency, the BCC model, which separates technical efficiency
and scale efficiency, has been applied to both the production and intermediation functions
of banks.
Figure 4 Average Efficiency of Turkish Banking (BCC)
The results of the BCC model are presented in Figure 4 (see also Appendix A
Table 2). As seen in this figure, after removing the scale effect, the efficiency pattern of
20the Turkish banking system remained the same, but the level of efficiency increased
relative to the CCR model. Similar to the CCR model, the efficiency trends for
production and intermediation functions were downward suggesting no positive effect of
liberalization on efficiency. These findings suggest that, during the study period, the
Turkish banking system had a scale problem.
This downward trend of the efficiency of the Turkish banking system for both
production and intermediation processes may not reflect the real effect of liberalization
program because of earlier shocks. In order to eliminate the effects of such shocks, we
examined the efficiency scores from 1981 to 1994. Figures 3 and 4 display the trends for
CCR and BCC models, respectively.
Figure 5: Average Efficiency of Turkish Banking after Liberalization (CCR)
In general, the trends are still downward, with the exception of technical
efficiency of intermediation function. Moreover, the slopes of the CCR efficiency scores
are steeper for the post-policy adjustment period (Figure 5). These results lead one to
believe that the liberalization program did not increase the efficiency of the Turkish
banking system to higher levels as anticipated. However, there are some indications of
progress, although isolated, in intermediation processes. The CCR scores for 1990
through 1994 indicate some progress in increasing efficiency (Figure 5). Moreover, after
removing the scale effect, the downward efficiency trend levels off for the intermediation
process (Figure 6). This may mean that if the Turkish banking system had operated at the
optimum scale, the liberalization program would have had an even greater positive
impact on the efficiency of banks.
Figure 6: Average Efficiency of Turkish Banking after Liberalization (BCC)
21Following the earlier discussion, the overall scale efficiency of Turkish banking
system  is calculated  by using the CCR  to BCC ratio,  Sk =  qk,ACR.  The results  are
qk,BCC
presented in Figure 7. Recall that the higher the value of S, the lower the scale problem of
the system. The scale efficiency of the Turkish banking system ranged from 75 percent to
95 percent for the production process and from 64 percent to 93 percent for the
intermediation process over the period examined (see Figure 7). This means that the
Turkish banking system suffered from 5 percent to 25 percent efficiency loss in the
production process and from 7 percent to 36 percent in the intermediation due to scale
problems. Figure 7 shows that scale problem for intermediation intensifies after
liberalization.
Figure 7 Scale Efficiency of Turkish Banking System
Average efficiency scores by ownership
The number of commercial banks in Turkey remained constant before 1980, at 30
(with the exception of 1976 and 1977 when it was 29). The number increased steadily
after 1980 reaching 53 in 1990 (see Appendix A Table 1). All of these banks were
commercial banks, but their ownership structure was different: some were state banks,
some were privately owned, and others were owned by foreign financial institutions.
Since the overall objectives and organizational structure of these banks were the same,
and since they operated in the same environment, we included all of them in the analysis.
However, it should be kept in mind that each one of these groups might have responded
to the liberalization program differently. In order to examine this issue, we looked at their
22efficiency scores separately, with CCR and BCC models for both production and
intermediation processes (Figures 8 and 9).
The results of the CCR model for production process are presented in Figure 8
(see also Appendix A Table 4). All groups had their lowest efficiency scores in 1993
(37.5 percent, 52.7 percent and 43.8 percent for state, private and foreign owned banks,
respectively). The highest score for state-owned banks is 79 percent, for private banks 88
percent, and for foreign owned banks 93.8 percent. Prior to 1980, state owned banks
performed poorly, whereas privately owned banks had a relatively better and stable
performance during the same period. Foreign-owned banks fluctuated, but outperformed
state banks and, in some years, even private banks. The efficiency scores of all groups
converge somewhat after 1980, though all fluctuate wildly. One interesting result was
that, after liberalization, they all follow a similar fluctuating pattern, which indicates that
banks were responding to economic changes similarly.
Figure 8 Efficiency of Turkish Banks by Ownership (CCRp)
In terms of the intermediation process, state-owned banks outperformed their
private and foreign-owned counterparts until 1988, while private banks were the least
efficient group until 1992. The efficiency scores for all groups in this category followed a
similar downward trend, particularly after 1984 (Figure 9). The better performance of
state banks in intermediation suggests that they did not utilize their own resources
efficiently in production, which implies highly publicized political interference cases.
The increase in the efficiencies after 1990, similar to the general efficiencies of Figures 3
and 4, should be noted.
Figure 9 Efficiency of Turkish Banks by Ownership (CCRi)
23When the scale effect from the production process is removed, the efficiency
scores for all groups improved as anticipated (Figure 10). Although the pattern is almost
the same, the wild fluctuation, particularly after liberalization period, is relatively steady.
This indicates that, regardless of ownership, all of these banks had serious scale
problems. The fluctuation of efficiency scores becomes much smoother after the
liberalization period, especially for the state banks. In fact, state owned banks improved
their technical capacity in production process after liberalization program.
Figure 10 Efficiency of Turkish Banks by Ownership (BCCp)
Figure 11 Efficiency of Turkish Banks by Ownership (BCCi)
In terms of the intermediation process, removing the scale effect by using the
BCC model produces similar outcomes: higher efficiency scores with relatively less
fluctuation and almost the same pattern (Figure 11). In this category, state banks
performed better than the others over the study period, although there was no clear
dominance of state banks as in the CCR model. Private banks, on the other hand,
remained the poorest performing group until 1992. Another important outcome of the
BCC model for intermediation process is that the efficiency scores of all groups became
closer to each other, suggesting that these groups had different scale efficiencies during
the study period.
The scale efficiency scores of Turkish banking by ownership are presented in
Figures 12 and 13 for both the production and intermediation processes. The scale
efficiency of state and private banks in the production process follow a similar pattern,
and their scores are relatively close to each other. Foreign-owned banks, on the other
24hand, operated at a relatively better scale size, and hence have better scores most of the
time.
Figure 12 Scale Efficiency of Turkish Banking System by ownership (production)
Another important finding of this analysis is that scale efficiency scores of all
groups are relatively stable for the years prior to the liberalization program, but after
1980 they fluctuate dramatically, indicating serious scale problems. In terms of the
intermediation process, state banks operated at a better scale level than their private and
foreign-owned counterparts, and had relatively steady scale efficiency until 1987. The
figures for private and foreign-owned banks vary over the same period, and their scale
efficiency is similar. All groups experienced a steep decline in scale efficiency after
1987. These results confirm that Turkish banking system, particularly after the
liberalization program, had a serious scale problem.
Figure 13 Scale Efficiency of Turkish Banking System by ownership (intermediation)
Percentage of efficient banks
There is a possibility that the decline of average efficiency scores may be due to a
few very inefficient banks rather than an overall trend. The percentage of efficient banks
and their time series trend prompt an analysis of this hypothesis. Figures 14 and 15
display this data respectively for production and intermediation processes. These results
confirm the earlier findings that the policy change did not bring about the intended
results, at least in terms of increasing efficiency.
Figure 14 Percentage of Efficient Banks (Production)
Figure 15 Percentage of Efficient Banks (intermediation)
25Sources of Inefficiency
One of the strengths of DEA is its ability to provide information about sources of
inefficiency in both the input and output sides. This information is extremely useful for
managers in improving organizational performance. We have already established the fact
that Turkish banking sector struggled with serious scale problems, which, in turn,
negatively affected the efficiency of the industry. However, we further demonstrated that,
even after the scale effect has been removed, the banking sector still suffered high
technical inefficiency. This indicates an excess use of resources, output shortfalls, or
some combination of the two. Figures 16 and 17 display the sources of inefficiency for
production and intermediation processes without the scale effect, respectively. The upper
part of the figures represents output shortfalls and the lower part represents excess use of
inputs.
Figure 16 Sources of Inefficiency (BCCp)
Figure 16 shows that, on average, Turkish commercial banks used excessive
amounts of resources for all their inputs over the study period. Looking at the lower
portion of the Figure, one can observe that until 1980 there was a stable, although not
fully efficient, utilization of all inputs. The usage of banks' own resources, occasionally
was less efficient than the other two, namely interest and fees paid and personnel
expenses. After the policy is introduced, however, the input usage efficiency became less
stable with larger variations.
On the output side, the results show that banks performed relatively well in
collecting deposits, especially until 1984. However, their non-interest income output
26varied radically within a shortfall range of 1 percent to 34 percent, mostly in the higher
inefficiency zone. These findings suggests that, on average, Turkish commercial banks
could have reduced all of their inputs and, at the same time, they could have produced
more in terms of deposits and income.
A similar trend is apparent in the intermediation process, with even greater
inefficiencies on the input side. In terms of outputs, Turkish banks performed better in the
collection of interest income, while displaying poor efficiency in transforming deposits
into loans. Similar to the production process, Turkish banks could have performed better
at both ends of the intermediation process.
Figure 17 Sources of Inefficiency (BCCi)
Further Discussion of Results
A review of the findings above demonstrates that there are three emerging
patterns irrespective of models or the functional form employed, which should be
interpreted within the context of the overall macroeconomic environment as well as the
ownership of banks. Before discussing the emerging patterns, it must be noted at the
outset that during the period under study inflation has been high and variable, averaging
about 30 percent during the 1  970s, 60 percent in the 1  980s, and above 70 percent during
the early 1  990s, and a number of stabilization programs failed to control inflation. This
volatile environment affected banks' asset and liability choices and had the effect of
reducing financial intermediation (Denizer, Gultekin and Gultekin, 2000). In particular,
commercial banks reduced their lending and share of credit as the percentage of total
bank assets declined over time. The fact that a stable macroeconomic environment has
27been lacking,  which contributed  to uncertainty  and  the risks  banks  faced,  has probably
reduced  system-wide  efficiency.
The first pattern  is that during 1981-1984,  the first four years  of the post-
liberalization  period,  efficiency  in the banking  sector  has improved  in all models  and
functional  forms used. As noted  by Atiyas  and Ersel  (1994),  the liberalization  measures
led to the entry  of new  banks,  and numerous  brokerage  houses,  which  resulted  in intense
competition  in the sector.  This forced  banks  to be more  efficient,  which  is probably
reflected  in the results.  However,  a financial  crisis  took place  in 1982,  which  caused
many brokerage  houses  exit  the system.  It may  be the case  that the deterioration  of
efficiency  measures  after 1984  was related  to banks reestablishing  themselves  as the
dominant  players  in financial  markets  in Turkey  and regaining  their market  power.  In
fact, a number  of studies  showed  that, even  after the reform  program,  banks still have
market  power  in Turkey  (Aydogan,  1992).
The second  pattern  coincides  with  the opening  of the capital  account  in 1989.  This
has had a major impact  on bank funding  and  investment  decisions  and may  have affected
bank efficiency.  Our findings  suggest  that  this affect  have  been positive. Liberalization
of the capital  account  enabled  banks  to borrow  abroad  at cheaper  rates  than domestically
available  and lend at market  rates  to the public  and  private  sectors. This may  be taken as
an indication  of one of the benefits  of financial  integration  at the banking  firm  level, and
such a development  has had significant  impact  on the overall  efficiency  of the Turkish
economy.
The third pattern  is related  to the efficiency  differences  between  public  and
private  banks. In both the production  and  intermediation  processes,  public  banks seem  to
28perform  better  or at least as well  as their  private and foreign  counterparts,  which  may
seem surprising.  However,  a number  of factors  probably  explain  this. Public banks have
always enjoyed  the benefits  of state support  and public  confidence  with respect  to safety
of deposits.  The deposits  of public  banks increased  after  the 1982  crisis in particular,
which may explain  the efficiency  jump of public  banks in production  process  in 1982.
Another  noteworthy  aspect  of the public  ownership  of banks is related  to credit.  Due to
political  pressures,  public banks  issue loans  more easily  than private  banks,  which has the
effect  of increasing  of their output and  making  them appear  more  efficient.  However,  this
may  not be the case  on a risk-adjusted  basis, as public  banks carry a large amount  of non-
performing  loans.  If adjustments  to their outputs  were made to reflect loan losses,  public
banks might actually  be much less  efficient  than  private banks.  The lack of detailed  data
on the bad loans  of public  banks  prevents  the in-depth  examination  of this hypothesis.
CONCLUSIONS
This study tested the hypothesis  that liberalization  policies  in the banking  sector
leads to efficiency  increases  in the core  processes  of the banks.  Every phase  of the
analysis,  the total efficiency  scores  by functionality  or ownership,  the percentage  of
efficient  banks, and the sources  of inefficiency  suggests  that the liberalization  did not
provide  the anticipated  efficiency  gains.  None of the efficiency  scores  displayed
consistent  increases  after the introduction  of the policy.  For all measures,  the scores
became  less stable with a wide range  of dispersion  during  the study period.  Among  the
two functions  of the banks,  intermediation  reacted  somewhat  more favorably  to the new
policy.  The expected  result  that the opening  up of financial  markets  would  have
29motivated management to use its resources more efficiently, which would have been
reflected positively in efficiency measures did not materialize.
Another unexpected result is the lack of a difference in efficiency between the
state-owned and privately owned banks. Due to their relatively smaller size and more
dynamic structure, privately owned and foreign-owned banks were expected to react
better to liberalization. The findings of this study generally do not support that
assumption. Similar results in sources of efficiency, together with other results, may lead
one to question the impact of liberalization. Nonetheless, it would be premature to draw
such a conclusion without looking into the context of the policy frarnework and
implementation. The fact that macroeconomic environment during the study period has
not been stable probably affected the financial system's efficiency and our results. In this
connection, macroeconomic stability may be a prerequisite for liberalization policies to
lead to efficiency gains.
Furthermore, the liberalization program is a continuous process with multiple
phases. As was discussed in Section 2, some of the initiatives were introduced gradually
after 1980. As a matter of fact, almost all of the scores display a significant increase in
the last years of the study period. One may speculatively suggest that the introduction of
the capital account liberalization policy, which allows foreign currency transfer to flow
easily beginning in 1989, may be the last piece of the liberalization process. The banking
sector might have begun to react to the complete package in later years. Future research
that extends the study period beyond 1994 may answer some of these questions.
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Table 3. Average Efficiency Scores of Turkish Banking
CCRp  BCCp  CCRi  BCCi
1970  71.35  82.74  66.29  71.8
1971  77.48  85.8  64.62  72.81
1972  79.52  86.91  59.04  73.16
1973  78.38  83.37  69.62  77.78
1974  79.65  83.99  60.59  74.63
1975  79.83  85.83  70.12  80.45
1976  73.79  83.76  76.76  84.48
1977  76.81  85.05  79.18  85.52
1978  80.29  87.23  82.76  88.7
1979  79.35  83.5  68.47  76.15
1980  73.81  77.9  57.63  63.67
1981  69.98  86.61  47.63  60.74
1982  74.05  84.37  56.28  65.89
1983  79.86  88.55  53.03  63.35
1984  79.37  88.32  61.82  68.49
1985  61.78  78.5  64.22  74.21
1986  71.79  79.49  54.57  67.34
1987  56.51  75.33  53.35  64.7
1988  71.39  84.46  35.31  54.76
1989  72  83.05  38.85  57.23
1990  58.01  76.42  41.09  56.54
1991  62.59  73.44  36.28  55.62
1992  70.55  77.99  43.1  63.34
1993  47.49  59.07  50.81  67.7
1994  64.88  74.42  63.13  73.94
31Table 4 Average  Efficiency  of Turkish  Banking  by Ownership
CCRp  CCRi  BCCp  - BCCi
SAEff  PAEff  FAEff  SAEff  PAEff  FAEff  SAEff  PAEff  FAEff  SAEff  PAEff  FAEff
1970  48.52  81.31  72.24  75.24  58.28  84.43  56.5  95.32  78.6  77.97  65.53  87.68
1971  59.33  85.82  76.29  70.42  61.28  68.05  62.99  95.01  90  74.67  69.25  85.08
1972  66.47  82.14  93.88  68.25  54.88  59.34  69.45  91.87  99.51  72.75  68.66  94.24
1973  57.38  88.02  76.98  80.61  64.34  71.4  61.25  94.16  79.02  83.28  73.33  86.85
1974  57.8  88.05  85.56  72.08  56.03  58.16  60.27  93.06  90.62  76.42  73.78  74.84
1975  57.76  87.85  87.91  81.1  64.79  72.13  62.85  94.11  94.54  85.05  78.53  79.9
1976  45.22  86.45  73.97  87.57  70.65  84.59  48.76  97.58  94.23  88.67  80.94  94.52
1977  55.47  86.88  73.24  88.51  73.16  90.42  58.19  95.88  91.69  91.97  81.24  94
1978  61.51  86.9  88.11  90.38  78.59  86.34  64.54  95.96  93.34  91.9  86.07  94.09
1979  62.27  83.79  93.5  76.43  63.3  75.82  64.59  89.11  96.08  79.62  73.76  79.93
1980  58.11  77.24  89.8  72.93  48.4  68.54  63.02  81.82  90.06  76.72  54.62  78.33
1981  48.11  75.38  82.92  63.67  40.19  48.57  69.9  95.18  83.2  68.41  56.18  64.17
1982  61.27  75.2  85.69  70.97  48  60.77  76.97  86.52  87.32  77.68  60.49  66.27
1983  79.14  77.65  84.41  70.75  47.53  48.77  89.11  90.4  84.77  75.29  61.59  56.97
1984  75.78  79.42  81.51  72.84  57.44  61.09  87.07  89.5  87.44  78.55  67.09  64.23
1985  75.99  60.68  55.21  79.31  52.33  72.58  86.42  82.33  68.51  86.35  64.36  81.33
1986  62.56  80.28  64.63  72.64  43.38  61.19  83.3  84.82  70.47  74.71  51.74  84.98
1987  48.26  53.62  64.47  70.12  42.06  61.41  80.45  73.86  75.01  77.89  55.56  71.38
1988  60.65  71.05  76.05  39.73  25  47.91  84.05  87.5  80.41  60.34  48.49  61.3
1989  67.63  73.81  71.18  39.38  33.87  45.55  84.22  87.9  75.86  61.51  56.04  57.21
1990  58.13  63.34  51.63  38.77  36.74  47.04  80.01  81.16  69.57  58.46  54.54  58.27
1991  54.28  70.32  55.89  30.59  26.64  50.54  71.21  81.01  64.71  56.18  49.42  63.25
1992  65.22  78.1  62.26  47.4  43.45  41.21  75.06  85.42  69.07  69.27  64.05  60.41
1993  37.51  52.74  43.81  36.06  55.62  49.31  64.15  65.96  48.19  65.12  70.54  64.79
1994  59.69  75.09  53.56  68.36  70.72  51.7  71.43  86.33  60.2  83.7  78.67  64.63
Table  5 Percentage  of Efficient  Banks in Turkey
CCRp  BCCp  CCRi  BCCi  No. of Banks
1970  0.17  0.3  0.2  0.33  30
1971  0.3  0.5  0.13  0.3  30
1972  0.23  0.5  0.13  0.37  30
1973  0.37  0.5  0.17  0.3  30
1974  0.4  0.53  0.1  0.33  30
1975  0.37  0.47  0.17  0.3  30
1976  0.21  0.59  0.14  0.34  29
1977  0.17  0.52  0.17  0.31  29
1978  0.27  0.57  0.27  0.47  30
1979  0.27  0.47  0.17  0.23  30
1980  0.23  0.3  0.13  0.2  30
1981  0.28  0.56  0.13  0.25  32
1982  0.24  0.52  0.09  0.18  33
1983  0.33  0.5  0.11  0.22  36
1984  0.31  0.54  0.15  0.26  39
1985  0.14  0.36  0.17  0.26  42
1986  0.21  0.29  0.1  0.25  48
1987  0.1  0.24  0.08  0.16  49
1988  0.26  0.42  0.08  0.16  50
1989  0.22  0.42  0.06  0.16  50
1990  0.09  0.3  0.11  0.19  53
1991  0.12  0.28  0.12  0.2  50
1992  0.21  0.31  0.06  0.17  48
1993  0.08  0.21  0.06  0.19  48
1994  0.17  0.3  0.06  0.19  47
32Table 6. Scale Efficiency of Turkish Banking
CCRp / BCCp  CCRi / BCCi
1970  0.86  0.92
1971  0.90  0.89
1972  0.92  0.81
1973  0.94  0.90
1974  0.95  0.81
1975  0.93  0.87
1976  0.88  0.91
1977  0.90  0.93
1978  0.92  0.93
1979  0.95  0.90
1980  0.95  0.91
1981  0.81  0.78
1982  0.88  0.85
1983  0.90  0.84
1984  0.90  0.90
1985  0.79  0.87
1986  0.90  0.81
1987  0.75  0.82
1988  0.85  0.64
1989  0.87  0.68
1990  0.76  0.73
1991  0.85  0.65
1992  0.90  0.68
1993  0.80  0.75
1994  0.87  0.85
Table 7. Scale Efficiency of Turkish Banking by Ownership
State Owned  Private  Foreign
CCRplBCCp  CCRi/BCCi  CCRp/BCCp  CCRi/BCCi  CCRp/BCCp  CCRi/BCCi
1970  0.86  0.97  0.85  0.89  0.92  0.96
1971  0.94  0.94  0.90  0.88  0.85  0.80
1972  0.96  0.94  0.89  0.80  0.94  0.63
1973  0.94  0.97  0.93  0.88  0.97  0.82
1974  0.96  0.94  0.95  0.76  0.94  0.78
1975  0.92  0.95  0.93  0.83  0.93  0.90
1976  0.93  0.99  0.89  0.87  0.79  0.89
1977  0.95  0.96  0.91  0.90  0.80  0.96
1978  0.95  0.98  0.91  0.91  0.94  0.92
1979  0.96  0.96  0.94  0.86  0.97  0.95
1980  0.92  0.95  0.94  0.89  1.00  0.88
1981  0.69  0.93  0.79  0.72  1.00  0.76
1982  0.80  0.91  0.87  0.79  0.98  0.92
1983  0.89  0.94  0.86  0.77  1.00  0.86
1984  0.87  0.93  0.89  0.86  0.93  0.95
1985  0.88  0.92  0.74  0.81  0.81  0.89
1986  0.75  0.97  0.95  0.84  0.92  0.72
1987  0.60  0.90  0.73  0.76  0.86  0.86
1988  0.72  0.66  0.81  0.52  0.95  0.78
1989  0.80  0.64  0.84  0.60  0.94  0.80
1990  0.73  0.66  0.78  0.67  0.74  0.81
1991  0.76  0.54  0.87  0.54  0.86  0.80
1992  0.87  0.68  0.91  0.68  0.90  0.68
1993  0.58  0.55  0.80  0.79  0.91  0.76
1994  0.84  0.82  0.87  0.90  0.89  0.80
33Table 8 Sources of Inefficiency (BCCp)
OWNRES  INTCOMP  PEREXP  TOTDEPO  CHCOMC
1970  -0.23  -0.23  -0.19  0.11  0.34
1971  -0.27  -0.18  -0.16  0.11  0.23
1972  -0.29  -0.17  -0.15  0.09  0.28
1973  -0.25  -0.19  -0.19  0.05  0.21
1974  -0.20  -0.20  -0.19  0.05  0.28
1975  -0.18  -0.22  -0.16  0.06  0.21
1976  -0.18  -0.19  -0.18  0.02  0.19
1977  -0.19  -0.20  -0.16  0.00  0.12
1978  -0.20  -0.17  -0.14  0.00  0.23
1979  -0.29  -0.20  -0.19  0.00  0.22
1980  -0.35  -0.24  -0.25  0.02  0.34
1981  -0.18  -0.17  -0.15  0.03  0.01
1982  -0.19  -0.16  -0.17  0.01  0.24
1983  -0.18  -0.14  -0.13  0.03  0.04
1984  -0.14  -0.12  -0.14  0.00  0.15
1985  -0.27  -0.32  -0.22  0.17  0.12
1986  -0.23  -0.28  -0.24  0.04  0.05
1987  -0.27  -0.31  -0.31  0.03  0.13
1988  -0.19  -0.20  -0.18  0.10  0.16
1989  -0.24  -0.23  -0.21  0.10  0.18
1990  -0.28  -0.26  -0.25  0.11  0.20
1991  -0.29  -0.29  -0.35  0.39  0.07
1992  -0.25  -0.24  -0.23  0.33  0.15
1993  -0.45  -0.50  -0.44  0.24  0.02
1994  -0.32  -0.26  -0.31  0.02  0.25
Table 9 Sources of Inefficiency (BCCi)
TOTDEPO  OPEXP  TOTLOAN  INTCOMC
1970  -0.28  -0.30  0.07  0.14
1971  -0.27  -0.29  0.15  0.08
1972  -0.27  -0.31  0.10  0.20
1973  -0.23  -0.25  0.06  0.12
1974  -0.26  -0.27  0.00  0.03
1975  -0.22  -0.23  0.11  0.13
1976  -0.19  -0.19  0.11  0.01
1977  -0.17  -0.14  0.21  0.01
1978  -0.11  -0.11  0.07  0.00
1979  -0.25  -0.24  0.23  0.00
1980  -0.36  -0.39  0.22  0.10
1981  -0.39  -0.40  0.08  0.09
1982  -0.38  -0.38  0.30  0.02
1983  -0.39  -0.38  0.33  0.02
1984  -0.32  -0.32  0.23  0.00
1985  -0.26  -0.28  0.31  0.05
1986  -0.32  -0.33  0.25  0.00
1987  -0.38  -0.37  0.23  0.25
1988  -0.46  -0.46  0.13  0.34
1989  -0.45  -0.45  0.13  0.21
1990  -0.44  -0.43  0.13  0.00
1991  -0.44  -0.44  0.20  0.00
1992  -0.51  -0.37  0.18  0.11
1993  -0.34  -0.32  0.27  0.16
1994  -0.29  -0.26  0.05  0.32
34Table 10 List of the Banks  Included  in the Study
I  DENIZCILIK BANKASI
2  ETIBANK
3  SUMERBANK
4  T.C. ZIRAAT BANKASI
5  T. EMLAK BANKASI
6  T. HALK BANKASI
7  T. VAKIFLAR BANKASI




12  ESKISEHIR BANKASI
13  MILLI AYDIN BANKASI
14  PAMUKBANK
15  SEKERBANK
16  TURK DIS TICARET BANKASI
17  TURK TICARET BANKASI
18  T. GARANTI BANKASI
19  T. IMAR BANKASI
20  T. IS BANKASI
21  T. TUTUNCULER BANKASI
22  YAPI VE KREDI BANKASI
23  TURK EKONOMI BANKASI
24  ADABANK
25  KOC-AMERIKAN BANK
26  TEKSTIL BANKASI
27  T. ITHALAT VE IHRACAT BANKASI
28  FINANSBANK
29  ULUSLARARASI ENDUSTRI VE TICARET BANKASI
30  OSMANLI BANKASI
31  ARAP-TURK BANKASI
32  BANK INDOSUEZ TURK A.S.
33  BNP. AK. DRESDNER BANK
34  BIRLESIK TURK KORFEZ BANKASI
35  MANUFACTURERS HANOVER BANK
36  MIDLAND BANK A.S.
37  TURK BANKASI LIMITED
38  CHEMICAL MITSUI BANK
39  BANK MELLAT
40  BANK DI ROMA S.P.A.
41  CITIBANK
42  CREDIT LYONNAIS
43  HABIB BANK LIMITED
44  HOLANTSE BANK UNI.  N.V.
45  KIBRIS KREDI BANKASI LIMITED
46  SAUDI AMERICAN BANK
47  SOCIETE GENERALE
48  THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK
49  STANDARD CHARTERED BANK
35Table 11 Variable List
Code  Variable Name
I  TOTASSET  TOTAL ASSETS
2  TOTLOAN  TOTAL LOANS
3  INVEST  PARTICIPATIONS
4  OWNRES  TOTAL OWN RESOURCES
5  TOTDEPO  TOTAL DEPOSITS
6  NETINC  NET INCOME BEFORE TAXES
7  INTCOMP  INTEREST AND COMMISION PAID
8  PEREXP  PERSONNEL EXPENSES
9  AMPROV  AMORTIZATION AND PROVISIONS
10  OTHEXP  OTHER EXPENSES AND LOSSES
11  OPEXP  OPERATING EXPENCES
12  TOTOPEX  TOTAL OPERATING EXPENCES
13  TOEXP  TOTAL EXPENSES
14  INTCOMC  INTERESTS AND COMMISIONS COLLECTED
15  CHCOMC  CHARGES AND COMMISIONS COLLECTED FOR BANKING
16  BANKINC  INCOME FROM BANKING
17  MISCPRF  MISC. PROFITS
18  TOTINC  TOTAL INCOME
19  BRANCH  NUMBER OF BRANCHES
36APPENDIX B
Models utilized in this study are formulated as:
CCR First Stage
Max q
s.t.  E  JZxJ  + s, =(l - wq)xq  (4)
X  ijYrj  -si  ( -wrq)yrj,  (5)
1;>O,  j=l....50;  qg0;  i=1....4;  r=l....3
where x,, and  y  are the ith  input and rth  output level for DMUj. A, is the weight of DMU
in  the facet for the  evaluated DMU.  w,  and  wr  are priorities.  s,  and  sr  are  slacks
corresponding to input and output respectively (  Ž 0). jo is the DMU being assessed. For
input minimization  model  w; is set equal to  lOOpercent, while  wr is  set equal to  0,
implying that the input reduction is targeted while keeping output unchanged. For output
maximization models, the reverse is true.
CCR Second Stage
Max  ,Fj-s-  +,Fr+sr  (6)
s.t.  Aj  Rxi  + s.- = (I - wEq)x,,(7
L  j Ajyr.-si  =(  -wrq)yrj,,  (8)
;  >0;  j=l ....  50;  q>0;  i=1 ....4,  r=l.... 3
1 where  F,-  and  F+  are priorities. In this application,  FJ-  is  where  X,  is the mean
xi
value of x,,  and F,+ is  - where Yr is the mean value of ye,.
Under  input  minimization  and  variable  returns  to  scale  conditions,  Warwick
Windows DEA software solves the following BCC models:
37BCC First Stage
Max  q=  UrYj,  + Ql-Q 2 (9)
s.t.  ErUrYri  jVxj +Q1 Q22  0  (10)
jVXj=  1  (1  1)
u,.v,i I Q 1 Q2 Ž0
By letting q  be the optimal value of q in the above model, the minimum and maximum
limit of the Qrange is obtained by solving the second stage.
BCC Second Stage
Min/Max Ql - Q2  (12)
s.t.  q* = EUrY,jo  + Q1  R  2  (13)
ErUrYrj  EVix#  +±Q  -Q 2 <0  (14)
SVXy  =  1  (15)
Ur  I Vj,  I  l  QK2  20
where  ur  is the weight of the rth output and v, is the weight of ith input for DMUj. Q, and
52 are the distance from frontier facet.
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45Figure 5: Average Efficiency of Turkish Banking after Liberalization (CCR)
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48Figure 8 Efficiency of Turkish Banks by Ownership (CCRp)
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49Figure 9 Efficiency of Turkish Banks by Ownership (CCRi)
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